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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

historically were exercised by ecclesiastical courts. Does a district
court, sitting as a court of equity, have the power, in the absence of
statutory authority, to award support and maintenance to a wife?
Some states hold that there is no such power unless it is given by
statutes or by constitutional provisions, 4 while other states hold that
it falls within the "inherent" powers of equity.5
The decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court appear to be at
variance. In the Earle case, the Supreme Court stated, ".. . the authority to grant alimony grows out of the equity powers of the court."
But in Cizek v. Cizek,6 the court said, "Matters pertaining to divorce,
separation, and alimony were originally of ecclesiastical cognizance.
But in this country they have always been regulated by statute, and
we think the courts have always looked to the statute as the sources
of their power."
In the Earle case, the court decreed that a husband whose conduct
had caused his wife to leave the home was liable for maintenance and
support apart from any action for divorce, and the fact that the statute
then in effect specified that alimony or support could be decreed as
an incident to divorce did not bar the exercise of equitable power.
The court said that the wife suffered a wrong for which there should
be a remedy when the husband neglected to fulfill his lawful duty to
provide for his family according to his financial ability.
However, in the Cizek case, the court held that there was no equity
power to award the husband's real estate to the wife as alimony when
the statutes specifically provided that the court might decree to the
wife such part of the personal estate of the husband and such alimony
out of his estate as it shall deem just.7 The statute was exclusive in its
grant of power and made no reference to any power to quiet title in
real estate as an alternative. There was no independent basis for an
exercise of general equity power.

'Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d. 870 (1942); Schneider v.
Schneider, 312 Ill. App. 59, 37 N.E.2d. 911 (1941); Young v. Young, 258 App.
Div. 934, 16 N.Y.S.2d. 598 (4th Dep't 1936); Cohen v. Cohen, 121 N.J. Eq. 299,
188 Atl. 244 (Ch. 1936); Bucknam v. Bucknam, 176 Mass. 229, 57 N.E. 343
(1900); Bowman v. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522 (1867).
' Dupont v. Dupont, 85 A.2d. 724 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1951); Avery v. Avery, 236
Iowa 9, 17 N.W.2d. 820 (1945); Wilson v. Wilson, 198 Miss. 334, 22 So.2d. 161

(1945); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 183 Va. 96, 31 S.E.2d. 284 (1944); Bliss

v. Bliss, 208 Vinn. 84, 293 N.W. 94 (1940); Radermacher v. Radermacher, 61
Idaho 261, 100 P.2d. 955 (1940); Haggert v. Haggert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W.
1035 (1911).

669 Neb. 797, 107 N.W. 1012 (1906).
7 Now a Nebraska statute gives a court discretionary power to award the
innocent party a share in the real estate of the guilty party in a decree of
divorce. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-321 (Reissue 1952). See Kozina v. Watkins
Lumber Co., 146 Neb. 594, 20 N.W.2d. 606 (1945); Lippincott v. Lippincott,
144 Neb. 486, 13 N.W.2d. 721 (1944).

RECENT CASES
It would appear that in each case the court reached a proper result,
but made a faulty generalization. The language in the two cases is
inconsistent and perhaps each statement should have been qualified.
The results of the two cases, however, are not inconsistent. In the
Earle case the court went beyond the statutes in order to remedy a
wrong, whereas in the Cizek case the court held there was no remedy
in equity because of the adequate statutory remedy.
Moreover, the Earle case involved a situation where there is a recognized legal duty and the question was whether or not equity will
implement that duty and see that it is enforced. The duty happens to
arise out of the marital relation but merges into the larger problem
of the over-all power of equity to compel the discharge of legal duties,
particularly where the remedy at law may be inadequate.
The court, in the instant case, was faced with these conflicting
theories as to the power of an equity court. It may be argued that the
court's decision follows the language of the Cizek case, while the
situation was more analogous to the Earle case. Assuming that the
court did not intend to deny the husband's legal duty to provide for
his wife according to his means, position, and station in life, but merely
to withhold an assertion of equity power to compel the discharge of
such duty, the question remains whether it was justified in so doing
because of an adequate remedy at law.
Although the instant case denies maintenance and support to the
wife, she is not without a remedy. She may complain to the county
attorney that her husband is not providing proper food, clothing and
shelter, and hence is guilty of a misdemeanor. 8 She may also charge
necessaries to her husband's account,9 a remedy in the nature of selfhelp. But that may be of doubtful efficacy since she takes her chances
as to what are necessaries and must find a merchant who is willing
to run the risk of having to resort to a law suit to collect his money
from the husband.
It would seem that the husband's duty is the same whether he and
his wife are apart or living under the same roof; therefore, the wife
would be as entitled to a decree in one case as in the other. However,
there may be a practical basis for the distinction that was not mentioned in the decision in the instant case. Where the husband and wife
are separated the wife's remedy of self-help by charging necessaries
is severely limited, since there is no presumption that she has authority to pledge her husband's credit.' 0 Moreover, when living apart, a
court order requiring the husband to pay a sum for her support presumably all goes for support and maintenance, whereas if she is living

'Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-449 (Reissue 1948).

See e.g., Acton v. Schoenauer, 121 Neb. 62, 236 N.W. 140 (1931); Belknap
v. Stewart,
38 Neb. 304, 56 N.W. 881 (1893).
"0Madden, Domestic Relations §§ 58 to 60 (1931).

